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Overview of the Application and Treatment of Act 
312 in Federal Courts 
Charles A. Nunmaker* 
INTRODUCTION 
The introduction and implementation of title 30, section 29 of the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes and articles 1552 and 1563 of the Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure—collectively known as “Act 312”—into the 
legacy litigation arena has brought about interesting and complex 
procedural considerations. Among these are the extent, if any, to which 
the Act is applicable in federal courts.1 While the Act as a whole is roundly 
recognized as procedural rather than substantive, certain of its elements 
carry definite substantive overtones. On occasion, Louisiana’s federal 
courts have adopted and employed some of these elements. This article 
explores the development and evolution of Act 312—particularly 
regarding its treatment by Louisiana’s federal courts—with the objective 
of identifying those portions of the Act which have been, or are likely to 
be, adopted by federal courts handling this type of legacy litigation. 
The focus of this article rests upon a survey of federal litigation 
implicating Act 312. Part I provides a basic history of Act 312. Parts II 
and III explore pertinent authority regarding jurisdictional issues in federal 
court litigation, with a particular eye to the Erie Doctrine and federal 
abstention, respectively. Part IV then analyzes the substantive application 
of Act 312 in the federal courts, concluding, in Part V, with an overview 
of the Act’s implications in federal court litigation. 
I. A BASIC HISTORY OF ACT 312 
While a detailed discourse on the history of Act 312 (and, particularly, 
of section 30:29) lies beyond the scope of this article, a general review is 
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 * Of Counsel with the law firm Krebs, Farley, PLLC. in New Orleans, 
Louisiana; graduate of Tulane University (B.A. cum laude 1980) and Tulane 
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 1. “Act 312” is a generic label for 2006 La. Acts 312 (effective 6/08/06), 
which amended and re-enacted LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:82(6), 89.1 and 
2015.1(B), (C)(1), (2) and (4), (D), (E)(1), (F)(2), (H), (I) and (K), and enacted 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29, 29.1 and 2015.1(L). As used in this article, “Act 
312” generally refers exclusively to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 and 
subsequently implemented LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 1552 and 1563 (2015). As 
a practical matter, most of the cases of note arose within the past ten years, but 
prior to the coverage of the 2014 amendments to Act 312. 
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necessary to establish a chronological backdrop for the development of 
federal jurisprudence relating to the Act.2 The proclaimed intent driving 
the passage of Act 312 was “to effectuate an orderly and certain procedure 
governing and implementing the remedy of environmental remediation in 
oilfield legacy cases, once the plaintiffs have asserted, and proven, a claim 
for remediation of environmental damages or the defendant has admitted 
to liability therefor”3 and to effect the legislative charge of ensuring “that 
damage to the environment is remediated to a standard that protects the 
public interest.”4 Act 312 changed the remedy available in legacy litigation 
cases by implementing a procedure aimed at safeguarding those elements 
of judicial awards attributable to the remediation or restoration of 
environmentally damaged properties to state regulatory standards.5 The 
procedure set forth in the Act mandates the deposit of such funds into court 
registries for judicial oversight and administration.6 
Civilian doctrine has long provided the foundational basis for the 
exercise of mineral rights in Louisiana, including in the context of 
landowner claims of surface damage or contamination through abuse of 
those rights. In early 2003, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued 
its opinion in Corbello v. Iowa Production,7 an opinion that was 
monumental in two respects. First, it recognized that a successful 
landowning plaintiff was not burdened with any obligation to dedicate 
recovered damages to the restoration or remediation of the 
                                                                                                             
 2. See Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 347 (Summer, 2007) [hereinafter Pitre], for a complete and cogent 
discussion of the history of Act 312. 
 3. State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., Inc., 2012-0884, p. 
29 (La. 1/30/13); 110 So. 3d 1038, 1059 (Guidry, J., concurring opinion). 
 4. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (2007). LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 states:  
“The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the 
healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall 
be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and 
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The 
legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.” 
 5. Louisiana Land & Exploration, 110 So. 3d at 1049; M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007-2371, p. 30 (La. 7/1/08); 998 So. 2d 16, 37; amended 
on reh’g, 2007-2371, p. 33 (La. 09/19/08); 998 So. 2d 40. In Savoie v. Richard, 
13-1370 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/2/14); 137 So. 3d 78, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
required the deposit into the district court’s registry of the full $38 million 
judgment for remediation to state requirements, even though the approved plan of 
remediation amounted to only $3.9 million of that amount, subject to 
reimbursement to the paying defendant, Shell Oil, of any amounts remaining in 
the registry after the court-certified completion of the remediation required by the 
plan. The plaintiffs in Savoie recovered a separate $18 million in damages not 
covered by Act 312 for private excess remediation claims under the terms of their 
mineral leases. Savoie, 137 So. 3d at 85 n.1. 
 6. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:29(C)(5–6), (D)(1–4) (2007). 
 7. Corbello v. Iowa Production, 2002-0826 (La. 2/25/03); 850 So.3d 686. 
2016] ACT 312 333 
 
 
 
environmentally damaged property.8 Second, relying upon the sanctity of 
contractual terms and party expectations, the court held that damages 
recoverable by a landowner for contractual breach of restoration 
obligations were not restricted by the market value of the property in 
question.9 The impact of Corbello was swift and significant; the case was 
followed by the filing of a multitude of damage suits brought by Louisiana 
landowners—in such volumes as to give rise to a specified nomenclature, 
“legacy litigation,” to identify this type of suit.10 
In the summer of 2003, title 30, section 2015.1 of the Louisiana 
Revised Statutes, the Groundwater Remediation Act (GRA) came into 
being.11 Developed as an initial response to the rise of legacy litigation, 
the statute is noteworthy in several respects. First, its passage introduces 
the requirement that those filing adversarial claims for damages within the 
statute’s scope provide written notice of the filing of the demand, through 
certified mailing, return receipt requested, to the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality (LDEQ).12 An additional provision states that no 
judgment or order granting relief in the litigation shall issue in the absence 
of the requisite proof of such notification.13 Moreover, the statute, as 
amended, recognizes the right of the LDEQ to intervene in any such 
action.14 Section 30:2015.1 (C) and (D) of the Groundwater Remediation 
Act provides for the submission, review, and judicial adoption or 
structuring of a plan determined to be the most feasible plan for evaluating 
and remediating contamination and protecting the condition of usable 
ground water consistent with the public interest.15 
Second, the law provides that all damages or payments in any civil 
action for the evaluation and remediation of contamination or pollution, 
                                                                                                             
 8. In reaching this first conclusion, the court found no indication of 
legislative consideration of the merits or detriments implicated by allowing 
private landowners to control the decision of whether or not to use recovered 
damages to restore contaminated land. However, the court declared that it was 
clear that the legislature had implemented no procedure to ensure that the 
landowners so devoted the recovered monies. Id. at 701. 
 9. Id. at 693–95. 
 10. Pitre, supra note 2, at 348; Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2009-2368, 
2009-2371 (La. 10/19/10); 48 So. 3d 234, 238 n.1. 
 11. 2003 La. Acts 1166, effective July 2, 2003. Prior to the enactment of LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 in 2006, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §30:2015.1 included both 
the LDEQ and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LDNR). As part 
of Act 312, the legislature amended the provisions of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
30:2015.1 to remove the LDNR from coverage under that statute. 2006 La. Acts 
312, § 1. 
 12. This notice must be made through certified mailing, return receipt 
requested. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(B) (2016). 
 13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(B). 
 14. Id. 
 15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (C), (D) (2016). 
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potentially or actually impacting ground water resources, shall be paid into 
the court registry.16 Disbursements of such amounts from the registry are 
subject to continuing judicial oversight and management.17 The law also 
contains provisions for awards of costs, fees, and expenses related to 
claims within its ambit to successful litigants and public authorities.18 
Finally, the preamble to the statute expresses legislative recognition that 
the natural resources of the state are to be “protected, conserved and 
replenished insofar as possible[,]” consistent with the public interest 
therein, and that the legislature is mandated to enact laws to implement 
such policy.19 
Despite its novel elements, the statute remains limited in scope. In fact, 
subsection (B) of the GRA restricts its coverage to claims “to recover 
damages for the evaluation and remediation of any contamination or 
pollution that is alleged to impact or threaten usable ground water.”20 
Thus, the post-enactment cases tended to omit—if not to disclaim 
entirely—allegations of breach or wrongdoing related to contamination or 
pollution of usable ground water.21 In other words, the focus of post-2003 
legacy litigation fell particularly upon claims of surface contamination. 
Consequently, a perception grew that landowners were pursuing financial 
windfalls at the expense of the public’s interest in maintaining 
environmental quality—i.e., that the legislative void discussed in Corbello 
had not been satisfactorily addressed. 
This controversy led to the enactment of Act 312.22 The Act’s 
resemblance to the GRA is unmistakable; all of the elements outlined in 
the context of the GRA find direct counterparts in section 30:29. However, 
                                                                                                             
 16. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §30:2015.1 (E). 
 17. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (E)(4). 
 18. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (F). 
 19. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (A). 
 20. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (B). 
 21. See, e.g., Brownell Land Co., L.L.C. v. Apache Corp., 2:05-cv-00322, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36594, pp. 17–19, 2005 WL 3543772 (E.D.La. 10/13/05); Frank C. 
Minvielle, L.L.C. v. IMC Global Operations, Inc., 380 F.2d 755, 761 (W.D. La. 2004) 
(note 19); LeJeune Bros. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., L.L.C., 2006-1557, pp. 17–18 
(La. App. 3d Cir. 11/28/07); 981 So.2d 23,35, writ den., 2008-0298 (La. 04/04/2008), 
978 So.2d 327. “[M]any petitions expressly stated that [landowners] were not bringing 
claims for contamination or pollution of usable ground water subject to section 2015.1, 
removing such litigation from the effect of section 2015.1.” Pitre, supra note 2, at 349. 
 22. See supra note 1. The provisions of Act 312 became effective on June 8, 
2006, and they applied to suits on record as of that date, except for any case in 
which the court, on or before March 27, 2006, had issued or signed an order setting 
the case for trial, and in which the litigant filing such demand for environmental 
damage did not exercise the right of designating the case for coverage under the 
Act. 2006 La. Acts 312, §§ 2–3. 
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the areas of coverage remain separate and distinct.23 By express provision, 
section 30:29 relates to “the procedure for judicial resolution of claims for 
environmental damage to property arising from activities subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Natural Resources, office of conservation.”24 
The statute’s primary distinction lies in its application to “environmental 
damage,”25 as opposed to the province of the GRA over “contamination or 
pollution that is alleged to impact or threaten usable ground water.”26 
Additionally, section 30:29 entails the involvement of the Louisiana 
Department of Natural Resources (LDNR), while the GRA now involves only 
the LDEQ.27 
Prior to 2012, Act 312 was generally characterized as consisting of six 
primary elements: 
1) Timely Notice. Act 312 requires that timely notice shall be 
furnished to the LDNR and to the Louisiana Office of Attorney 
General (LOAG) immediately upon the assertion of a judicial 
demand relating to a claim for environmental damage.28 
2) Stay. The litigation in which such judicial demand is asserted 
shall be stayed for a period of thirty days after such notice is 
issued and the return receipt thereof is filed with the court. 
3) State Intervention. Under subsection 30:29(B)(2), the State 
(particularly, the LOAG and the LDNR) has the prerogative—
but not the obligation—of intervening in such litigation in 
accordance with the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. 
4) Determination of Most Feasible Plan. Subsection C of section 
30:29 specifies the role and function of LDNR’s Office of 
Conservation (OCC) in the review, development, and 
submission of plan(s) for the evaluation and/or remediation of 
environmental damage. 
                                                                                                             
 23. In conjunction with the 2006 enactment of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29, 
subsection (L) was added to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (2016) to expressly 
provide that the latter “shall not apply to oilfield sites or exploration and 
production (E&P) sites regulated by the Department of Natural Resources, office 
of conservation.” Such sites were expressly noted to be the same sites within the 
definitions and coverage of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(4) (2007). See supra 
note 11. 
 24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (2016). 
 25. Id. 
 26. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(B) (2016). LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
30:2015.1(L) (2016) provides expressly that the statute shall not apply to oilfield 
sites or exploration and production sites regulated by LDNR. 
 27. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1. 
 28. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:29(B)(1). 
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5) Provision for Payment of Damages. The statute provides for the 
payment of all claims associated with the evaluation or 
remediation of environmental damages and it further provides 
that the court shall oversee the actual implementation of the plan 
adjudicated to be “most feasible.”29 
6) State Recovery of Costs and Expenses. Section 30:29(E) 
addresses the recovery from the responsible party of costs, fees, 
and expenses by successful litigants and by the State.30 
In addition to the six foregoing elements, subsections 30:29(J)(1) and 
(2)—both part of the original statute—establish what could be described as 
another fundamental element of the Act: 
7) Settlement Oversight. Court approval is required for any 
settlement reached in connection with a case subject to the 
statute.31 Moreover, notice of the settlement must be 
communicated to the LOAG and the LDNR, both of which have 
a statutory minimum thirty day period to review the given 
settlement and comment to the court before any judicial 
confirmation of the settlement occurs.32 If the court requires 
remediation after a contradictory hearing, the court shall not 
certify or approve any settlement until monies sufficient to fund 
such remediation are deposited into the registry of the court.33 
The court has the prerogative of waiving the requirements of the 
statute if the settlement is for a minimal amount and is not 
dispositive of the entire case.34 Subsection (J) includes provision 
for the recovery of costs, expenses, and fees by the LDNR and 
the LOAG if either had intervened in the matter prior to the 
settlement having been reached. 
                                                                                                             
 29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:29(D), (F). 
 30. These six elements were delineated in 2007 in Pitre, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. at 
350–53. The Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated the six-element description of the 
Act in M. J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007-2371, p. 29 (La. 07/01/08); 998 
So. 2d 16, 36, amended on reh’g, 2007-2371, p. 33 (La. 09/19/08); 998 So. 2d 40. 
 31. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(J)(1) (2007). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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In 2012, Act 312 was revised and amended to introduce additional 
procedures,35 more particularly described as follows: 
8) The Notice of Intent to Investigate. The 2012 amendments 
added subsection (B)(7) of title 30, section 29 of the Louisiana 
Revised Statutes to provide for the suspension of up to one 
year of the prescriptive period applicable to any claim covered 
under the statute upon service on the LDNR and key parties 
of a notice of intent to investigate alleged environmental 
damage and the identification of environmental testing 
information in any judicial demand filed subsequent thereto. 
9) The Environmental Management Order. The Environmental 
Management Order is a mechanism for managing the 
investigation, testing, and discovery procedures related to 
environmental damage cases. It was established under 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1552, which was 
enacted through the 2012 amendments to Act 312.36 
10) The Preliminary Hearing. The 2012 amendments also enacted 
subsection 30:29(B)(6), which sets forth the procedure for a 
preliminary hearing to traverse “whether there is good cause 
for maintaining the defendant as a party in the litigation.” The 
hearing process specifically focuses upon the plaintiff’s 
allegations of environmental damage and causation.37 A 
claimant bears the prima facie burden of introducing evidence 
to support the allegations of environmental damage.38 After 
that, the preliminary hearing movant has the burden of 
establishing the absence of genuine issue of material fact as to 
that party’s lack of legal responsibility for the alleged 
environmental damage. Any dismissal as a result of a 
preliminary hearing shall be without prejudice. However, if 
the dismissed defendant is not rejoined, that defendant shall 
be entitled to a judgment of dismissal with prejudice 
following entry of the final judgment in the case-in-chief. The 
                                                                                                             
 35. 2012 La. Acts 779, sec. 1. Section 2 of Act 779 provided, “The provisions of 
the Act shall not apply to any case in which the court on or before May 15, 2012, has 
issued or signed an order setting the case for trial, regardless of whether such trial 
setting is continued.” The effective date of the 2012 amendments was August 1, 2012. 
The same provision was included in Section 3 of 2012 La. Acts 754, which rendered 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 1552 and 1563 (2016) effective as of August 1, 2012. 
 36. 2012 La. Acts 754, sec. 1. 
 37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(6) (2016). 
 38. Id. 
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preliminary hearing procedure is available in addition to the 
general pretrial rights and remedies available to all party 
litigants under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. 
11) The Limited Admission of Responsibility for Environmental 
Damage. The original terms of Act 312 allowed for a responsible 
party’s admission of liability for environmental damage.39 
However, the 2012 amendments introduced article 1563 and its 
concept of the limited admission of liability for environmental 
damage into the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. More 
specifically, article 1563 provides for an admission of liability 
for environmental damage limited to a party’s responsibility to 
implement the most feasible plan to evaluate and, if necessary, 
to remediate to regulatory standards all or a portion of the 
contamination that is the subject of the litigation or remediation. 
The limited admission does not constitute an admission of 
liability for private damages liability under subsection 30:29(H), 
and it cannot result in any waiver of the admitting party’s rights 
and defenses in such a case. However, the admission is subject 
to the evidentiary parameters set forth in articles 702–705 of the 
Louisiana Code of Evidence and in article 1425 of the Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure. Article 1563(A)(6) of the Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure additionally requires the deposit of a 
minimum $100,000 sum to cover the cost of the OCC’s review 
of the plans and submittals under section 30:29, subject to 
reimbursement to the payor of any unused amounts.40 
12) Waiver of Indemnification for Punitive Damage Liabilities. 
Subsection 30:29(L), also added through the 2012 amendments, 
mandates that when a responsible party admits liability for 
remediation of environmental damage pursuant to the terms of 
the statute, the admission constitutes a waiver of the right to 
enforce contractual indemnification clauses bearing on punitive 
damages arising out of environmental damage covered under Act 
312.41 
Act 312 was amended and modified once again in 2014, but with the 
provision that the changes would not apply to (1) any case filed before 
                                                                                                             
 39. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(1) (2007). 
 40. 2012 La. Acts 754, sec. 1. 
 41. For a listing of the key elements added by the 2012 amendments, see Loulan 
Pitre Jr., Six Years Later: Louisiana Legacy Lawsuits since Act 312, 1 LSU J. OF 
ENERGY L. & RESOURCES (2012), available at http://digitalcommons.law.lsu  
.edu/jelr/vol1/iss1/10. 
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March 10, 2014; or (2) any case in which the court had, on or before that 
date, issued or signed an order setting the case for trial, regardless of 
whether the trial setting had been continued.42 These amendments became 
effective on August 1, 2014. 
Subsection 30:29(B)(6) was modified to provide for the award of fees 
and costs in favor of any named defendant which succeeded at the 
preliminary hearing stage and was not later rejoined into the action. This 
element is generally regarded as a penal-type sanction against a plaintiff’s 
assertion of a frivolous Act 312 claim against a given defendant.43 
Additionally, the legislature added subsection 30:29(C)(2)(c), which 
establishes a rebuttable presumption in cases of a limited admission of 
liability under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1563. That 
presumption provides that the plan approved or structured by the LDNR 
(after appropriate consultation with LDEQ) represents the most feasible 
plan to address the environmental damage made subject of the limited 
admission.44 Upon a party’s request, the jury is to be instructed to this 
effect.45 Article 1563(A)(2) was likewise amended to include the same 
substantive wording. 
“Contamination” had always been a key element of the definition of 
“environmental damage” under Act 312, but the 2014 amendments added 
an express definition for the term “contamination.”46 The new statute 
states that “contamination” means, “the introduction or presence of 
substances or contaminants into a usable ground water aquifer, an 
underground source of drinking water (USDW) or soil in such quantities 
as to render them unsuitable for their reasonably intended purposes.”47 
Thus, in the context of “any actual or potential impact, damage, or injury 
to environmental media caused by contamination resulting from activities 
                                                                                                             
 42. 2014 La. Acts 400, Section 3. 2015 La. Acts, No 448 did not directly 
amend LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (2007), but enacted LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
30:29.2, which requires a “meet and confer” of the parties to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 30:29 cases within sixty days of the end of the stay provided by LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 30:29(B)(1), in an effort to assess the dispute, narrow the issues, and reach 
agreements pertaining to the litigation of the action. The statute also provides 
mechanisms for convening and conducting mediations of such cases. The 
effective date of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29.2 occurred on August 1, 2015, with 
applicability extending to those cases then pending which had not then been set 
down for trial, or which are set down for trial—originally or as continued—after 
February 1, 2016. 
 43. See, e.g., Kaki J. Johnson, The Migration from the Rig to the Courthouse: 
Oil and Gas Legacy Litigation in Louisiana, 60 LOY. L. REV. 647, 682 (Fall 2014). 
 44. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 30:29(C)(2)(c) (2016). 
 45. Id. 
 46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(1) (“Contamination”) and (2) 
(“Environmental damage”). 
 47. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 30:29(I)(1). 
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associated with oilfield sites or exploration and production sites[,]” 
consideration of “environmental damage” must involve the assessment of 
contamination under the new definition.48 Of course, the burden initially 
faced by a plaintiff attempting to survive a preliminary hearing under 
subsection 30:29(B)(6) and article 1563 requires the introduction of 
evidence to support the allegations of environmental damage.49 The 2014 
amendment appears to heighten that burden, at least to the extent that it 
requires an additional degree of proof relating to contamination. 
In what may have been a response to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s 
opinion in State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Company, 
Inc.,50 the 2014 amendments eliminated the provision of section 30:29(H)(1), 
which had provided that nothing in that section should be construed to 
“preclude a judgment ordering damages for or implementation of additional 
remediation in excess of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court 
pursuant to this Section, as may be required in accordance with the terms of 
an express contractual provision.”51 Furthermore, the 2014 amendments 
added a clause to section 30:29(H)(1) specifying that any award granted in 
connection with the judgment for additional remediation in excess of the 
requirements of the feasible plan adopted by the court would not have to be 
paid into the registry of the court.52 At the same time, the legislature added a 
sentence to subsection 30:29(H)(2) stating that awardable damages under the 
statute would be governed by new subsection (M), which was added to the 
statute for the purpose of delineating the elements of recoverable damages 
under Act 312. Specifically, subsection (M) set out four exclusive categories 
of damages recoverable in an action under Act 312: 
1) the cost of funding the most feasible plan, as adopted by the 
court; 
2) the cost of any additional remediation required by an express 
contractual provision providing for remediation to original 
condition or to some other specific remediation standard; 
                                                                                                             
 48. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(2). 
 49. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(6) and La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. 
art. 1563 (2016). 
 50. 12-0884 (La. 01/30/13); 110 So. 3d 1038. 
 51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (H)(1) (2012) (later amended). 
 52. Id. 
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3) the cost of evaluating, correcting, or repairing environmental 
damage shown to have been caused by unreasonable or 
excessive operations,53 provided that such award is not 
duplicative of any damages recovered in items (1) and (2); and 
4) the cost of non-remediation damages. 
Subsection (M) additionally provides that none of its provisions shall 
be construed to alter the traditional burden of proof or to imply the 
existence or extent of damages, or to affect an award of attorney’s fees or 
costs under the other provisions of section 30:29. 
II. THE ERIE CONUNDRUM: THE FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTER OF THE 
ACT 312 
The Erie doctrine frames the question of governing law in federal 
courts.54 Louisiana’s federal courts generally apply the Erie analysis of 
governing law as follows: 
The district court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, must apply the 
substantive law of Louisiana, while employing Federal procedural 
rules. In the absence of a valid Federal Civil Rule addressing the 
point, the court must determine whether a particular rule is 
procedural or substantive by considering the “twin aims of the 
Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of 
inequitable administration of the laws.”55 
The Erie characterization of Act 312 elements plays a critical role in 
defining the legal analysis. Thus, in a federal diversity context, a 
fundamental issue with regard to Act 312 lies in whether the statutory 
provision under scrutiny is procedural or substantive in nature. 
                                                                                                             
 53. Subsection (M) spells out that the determination of unreasonableness or 
excessiveness of operations with regard to Item (3) is to be assessed under the 
rules, regulations, lease terms, and implied lease obligations arising by operation 
of law, or under standards applicable at the time of the activity that is the subject 
of the complaint. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §30:29(M). 
 54. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 55. Frank C. Minvielle v. IMC Global Operations, 380 F.Supp.2d 755, 759 
(W.D. La., 2004) (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra; Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 
460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965)). If the diversity case involves an unsettled 
question of state substantive law, the federal court must apply an “Erie-guess” as to 
how the state’s highest court would resolve the issue. If the state’s highest court has 
not yet spoken on the issue, federal courts may refer to the rulings of the state’s 
intermediate appellate courts for guidance. TS & C Investments, L.L.C. v. Beusa 
Energy, Inc., 637 F.Supp.2d 370, 373–74 (W.D. La., 2009). 
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Until the 2014 amendments, as a matter of Louisiana state law, the 
answer was certain: “30:29 is procedural, rather than substantive, and does 
not create a right of action in favor of landowners.”56 Indeed, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court recognized section 30:29 to be a “solely procedural 
statute” that does not create or abrogate any substantive rights.57 The 
courts cited subsection 30:29(H) as principal support for this conclusion.58 
In some instances, federal courts considering Act 312 have reached 
the same conclusion that the Act is procedural rather than substantive. 
Accordingly, courts abiding by this conclusion found no compelling need 
under Erie to employ Act 312 as governing law.59 In other instances, the 
courts have found it unnecessary to reach an Erie determination, 
concluding that specific terms of Act 312 are of fundamental significance 
or can otherwise be read to open the door to the exercise of inherent 
judicial discretion. In this way, federal judges find the latitude to adopt 
pre-trial and trial procedures that are consistent with Act 312’s approach 
to the handling of legacy litigation cases.60 
That being said, the enactment of the 2014 amendments to Act 31261 
raises the prospect of renewed focus upon the debate concerning the 
procedural or substantive nature of the Act—particularly in the federal 
courts. While the essential general characterization of the Act as 
procedural does not appear to have changed, the addition of subsection 
30:20(M) and its delineation of compensable Act 312 damage elements 
brings with it the potential of new Erie-based legal arguments. The most 
that can be said at this juncture is that the question of whether the 2014 
amendments to section 30:29 introduced substantive elements of law has 
yet to be definitively resolved in the jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                             
 56. Wagoner v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 45-507, pp. 12–13 (La. App. 2d Cir. 
11/24/10); 55 So.3d 12, 26 (on rehearing). 
 57. State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., Inc., 2012-0884, 
pp. 21–23 (La. 01/30/13); 110 So. 3d 1038, 1053–54. 
 58. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007-2371, p. 29 (La. 7/1/08); 
998 So. 2d 16, 35–36. 
 59. See, Alford v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 13 F.Supp.3d 581, 589 (E.D. La. 
04/01/14) n.25 (order as modified); see also Alford v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, 
L.L.C., 2:13-cv-05457 (ref 2:13-cv-05703), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55724, 2014 
WL 1612454 (E.D. La. 04/22/14) (R.Doc. 165, n.25). 
 60. Consider, Brownell Land Co., L.L.C. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 538 F.Supp 954, 
957-59 (E.D. La. 2007). 
 61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (2016). See generally, 2014 La. Acts 400. 
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III. THE ISSUE OF FEDERAL COURT ABSTENTION 
In a manner similar to the Erie approach, federal courts have rejected 
the position that Act 312 cases must be brought and heard exclusively in 
Louisiana’s state courts. In the past, the argument typically presented by 
plaintiffs (usually landowners whose cases have been removed to federal 
court) was that federal court abstention was required under the so-called 
Burford abstention doctrine. Alternatively, plaintiffs call for federal 
deferral to the “primary jurisdiction” of the regulatory authorities (in the 
particular case of Act 312, the LDNR). 
A. Burford Abstention 
The argument raised by parties seeking to effect abstention in legacy 
litigation cases focused primarily upon the fact scenario arising in Burford 
v. Sun Oil Co.62 In that case, an oil company sued in federal court to 
collaterally attack the validity of a conservation order issued by the Texas 
Railroad Commission (Commission), the mineral-rights regulatory 
authority in Texas. The conservation order granted Burford a drilling 
permit for four wells on a small piece of East Texas land.63 One of the 
claims raised by the plaintiff was that the regulatory action represented a 
deprivation of due process of law, but in essence, the case was a simple 
proceeding in equity to enjoin the enforcement of the Commission’s order. 
The central issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the federal 
courts should intervene in a matter of such fundamental state interest and 
discretion.64 The Court presented a full review of the Commission’s 
history and its function as part of a coordinated state regulatory system—
a system complete with provision for thorough judicial review by the 
Texas’ own courts. In the end, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]hese 
questions of regulation of the industry by the state administrative agency, 
whether involving gas or oil prorationing programs or Rule 37 cases [the 
state’s well spacing rule], so clearly involves basic problems of Texas 
policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the Texas 
courts the first opportunity to consider them.”65 Hence, the species of 
federal abstention recognized by the Court has come to be known as 
Burford abstention. 
The Burford abstention doctrine has been raised several times with regard 
to Act 312, but it appears that none of these efforts has met with success. 
                                                                                                             
 62. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
 63. Id. at 316. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 332. 
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In 2007, the plaintiff in Brownell Land Co., L.L.C. v. Oxy USA, Inc. 
opposed the post-removal litigation of its Act 312 suit in the Eastern 
District of Louisiana, arguing that, under Burford, the court should 
abstain from hearing the case out of deference to the role assigned the 
LDNR under the Act.66 District Judge Carl Barbier, presiding over the 
case, first noted the superficial appeal of the plaintiff’s argument, before 
ultimately giving effect to binding Fifth Circuit authority set forth in 
Webb v. B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc.67 Relying on Webb, Judge Barbier held 
that a federal court cannot exercise Burford abstention in an Act 312 
action for damages, since the court is not being asked to equitably weigh 
competing interests.68 Rather, in an Act 312 case, the court has no 
discretion on whether to award damages upon a jury’s determination 
that, as a matter of fact, contamination existed.69 Application of Burford 
abstention would therefore be inappropriate.70 
Similarly, in C.S. Gaidry, Inc. v. Union Oil Company of California, 
District Judge Sarah Vance rejected a landowner’s assertion that Burford 
required federal court abstention in a case brought under Act 312.71 The 
basis for this determination was simple: “Plaintiffs’ contention that this 
statute requires the Court to abstain under Burford ignores the fact that 
they are asking primarily for damages and not equitable relief.”72 
Applying Webb, the court found that Burford abstention does not apply 
to cases involving legal, as opposed to equitable, claims. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Gaidry complaint included a prayer for 
injunctive relief to compel restoration of the property did not render 
Burford applicable to the case. Addressing that contention, Judge Vance 
reiterated the findings set forth prior to the enactment of Act 312 in a 
different Brownell Land case, Brownell Land Co. v. Apache Corp., 
wherein District Judge Africk held that the disposition of legacy 
litigation in a federal setting would involve no difficult or unsettled state 
                                                                                                             
 66. Brownell Land Co. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d. 954, 958–59 (E.D. 
La. 2007). See also supra, note 60, for other mention of this case. 
 67. 174 F.3d 697, 704–05 (5th Cir. 1999). The Webb case built upon the develop-
ment of Burford abstention as set forth in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 
706, 729, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996), with Webb recognizing the rule that 
“a court may not remand pursuant to Burford abstention if the plaintiff seeks 
damages.” Webb, 174 F.3d at 701. In essence, the Burford abstention doctrine has 
been limited to actions in equity. Id. 
 68. Brownell Land, 538 F. Supp. 2d. at 958–59. 
 69. Id. at 959. 
 70. Id. 
 71. C.S. Gaidry, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 2:09-cv-02762, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83096, at *14 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2009). 
 72. Id. 
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law implicating substantial matters of state policy.73 The same rationale 
underscored the rejection of Burford abstention in a 2010 GRA case 
brought in the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Louisiana.74 
B. Brillhart Abstention in Declaratory Judgment Actions 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cureington represents a case of a federal 
court’s deeming appropriate the grant of a stay in an Act 312 dispute.75 
The distinctive feature of that suit, filed by Chevron in federal court in 
response to the landowner’s threat to institute state court litigation, lay in 
the fact that the Plaintiff sought purely declaratory relief.76 Chevron sought 
a judgment declaring that it was not liable to the landowner under any 
theory of liability for damages resulting from oil and gas operations 
conducted on the property.77 Alternatively, Chevron sought a judicial 
decree under section 30:29, referring the case to the LDNR for approval 
of a remedial plan and authorizing Chevron to enter the property for the 
purpose of implementing the approved remediation plan.78 The landowner 
subsequently filed the state court action and soon thereafter launched a 
direct summary challenge in the federal action against maintenance of the 
federal case.79 Specifically, the landowner sought dismissal of the federal 
declaratory judgment case on abstention grounds.80 
At the outset of its analysis, the court found that Chevron’s inclusion 
of the request for alternative relief in the form of referral to the LDNR 
indicated “a calculated effort to thwart” the abstention doctrine 
particularly applicable to declaratory judgment actions through Brillhart 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. at *14–20; see Brownell Land Co. v. Apache Corp., 2:05-cv-00322, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36594, at *16 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2005). 
 74. Jumonville v. Hercules, 3:10-cv-00393, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115177 
(M.D. La. Sept. 22, 2010), report adopted, 3:10-cv-00393, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
115164 (M.D. La. Oct. 27, 2010). 
 75. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cureington, 3:10-cv-00764, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 28978, 2011 WL 1085661 (W.D. La., Feb. 18, 2011), adopted by, 
dismissed without prejudice by, 3:10-cv-00764, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28735 
(W.D. La., Mar. 21, 2011). 
 76. Id. at *3–4. 
 77. Id. at *4–6. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at *7–8. 
 80. Chevron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28978, at *8. 
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v. Excess Texas Employers’ Insurance Co. of America.81 In fact, the 
landowner and Chevron had already agreed that, upon a finding of liability 
in the state court action, the case should be referred to the LDNR for 
implementation of a remediation plan.82 Because no dispute between the 
parties existed as to this point, there was no justiciable case or controversy 
to support the exercise of federal jurisdiction over Chevron’s alternative 
claim.83 Therefore, the court considered the case to be a pure declaratory 
judgment action subject to the edicts of Brillhart abstention.84 The court 
concluded that Chevron’s federal suit amounted to a procedural forum 
shopping maneuver that could not prevail over the interests of comity and 
the prudent administration of justice as effected through state court 
resolution of the case.85 The court recognized the appropriateness of 
abstention, granted the landowner’s motion for summary judgment, and 
dismissed the federal case without prejudice.86 
The application of Brillhart abstention as recorded in Cureington is 
limited to the remote factual scenario of an Act 312 defendant’s instituting 
a federal declaratory judgment action in the face of state court litigation 
on the same issues. As a general rule, the Brillhart abstention doctrine is 
simply inapplicable to the typical Act 312 case of a federal suit brought by 
a landowning plaintiff or a state suit removed to federal court. 
C. Erie and Abstention Conclusions 
Act 312 does not divest federal courts of original jurisdiction, and any 
argument that the LDNR holds primary jurisdiction over remediation 
matters to the exclusion of the federal or state judiciary has been put to 
rest. Therefore, the position that Act 312 requires a federal court to defer 
to the regulatory authority of the LDNR in legacy litigation cases or to 
otherwise abstain from hearing the case has been soundly rejected. 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. at *13 (referencing Brillhart v. Excess Texas Employers’ Insurance 
Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)). This specific abstention doctrine 
pertaining to declaratory judgments is generally referred to as “Brillhart 
abstention.” The Brillhart abstention doctrine is based upon the principle that it 
would be uneconomical as well as vexacious for a federal court to proceed with a 
declaratory judgment action where another suit is pending in state court between 
the same parties with the same non-federal issues. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495. 
 82. Chevron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28978, at *13. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at *12–13. In adopting such an approach, the court rendered arguments 
for application of the more stringent parameters of Colorado River abstention 
inapposite. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 
U.S. 800 (1976). 
 85. Chevron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28978, at *28–29. 
 86. Id. at *30–31. See also Chevron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28978, at *3–4. 
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While the jurisprudential consensus is that the Act is procedural 
overall, sweeping categorization can be perilous. As examination of the 
case law bears out, certain elements of the statute have worked their way 
into application by the federal courts, while other elements have been 
expressly rejected.87 Moreover, the 2014 amendments to section 30:29, 
and the enactment of subsection 30:29(M) in particular, may have 
introduced new substantive elements into the analysis. Nevertheless, 
federal courts have generally adhered to federal procedure in adjudicating 
the various elements of legacy litigation complaints. 
IV. SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: PARTICULAR 
ELEMENTS OF THE ACT 
A. The Order of Trial and Assessment of the Most Feasible Plan 
In Brownell Land88—a case that arose during the pendency of 
Weyerhauser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C.89—Judge Barbier refused to 
bifurcate the pending suit into separate proceedings for the determination 
of liability and damages.90 The court held that Act 312 was procedural, so 
that nothing precluded the court from presenting the damages case to the 
same jury that was to decide liability.91 Moreover, the court found no 
requirement under either Erie or the Act compelling separate treatment for 
the damages associated with remediation.92 Judge Barbier explained: 
[T]here is nothing wrong with a jury determination of the amount of 
the damages. Thereafter [L]DNR will decide (with the court's 
approval) how much of those damages are to be used for remediation. 
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit has held that there is no need for a 
second jury for damages, and there is no reason for this Court to 
                                                                                                             
 87. Consider Brownell Land Co., 538 F.Supp. at 957–59. 
 88. Id. 
 89. In a September 2008 ruling in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., 
No. 1:04-cv-02177, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84329, at *6 (W.D. La. Sept. 29, 
2008), the court opted against applying the “procedural aspects” of LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(1) in a diversity case to order the development of a 
remediation plan or similar procedural undertaking. Nevertheless, and in a “more 
substantive vein,” the court affirmatively noted the statute’s provisions regarding 
the substantive right to the recovery of costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees. 
Weyerhaeuser, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84329, at *11-13. The Weyerhauser case 
is discussed in different contexts, infra at Parts IV (B, C, E, F and H). 
 90. Brownell Land Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d. at 959. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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disagree.93 
In so ruling, the court effectively followed the Louisiana Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeal’s opinion in Duplantier Family Partnership v. B.P. Amoco.94 
Moreover, Judge Barbier questioned the plaintiff’s supposition that the Act’s 
provisions for a LDNR hearing during the pendency of litigation likely could 
not be enforced upon removal of the case to federal court: 
[I]t is unclear why that would be so. This court is bound to follow the 
substantive law of the state, and even its procedural law, when it 
affects substantive rights. Such a rule allows this Court to enforce 
state procedural requirements related to medical malpractice, and it 
is not clear why this case is any different. In each of these cases, the 
federal court determined whether a plaintiff had complied with the 
procedures of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act. Other Courts 
have held that even though compliance with Medical Malpractice 
schemes is procedural, it must be followed by a federal court sitting 
in diversity. Regardless, this particular issue does not have to be 
decided by this Court at this particular time.95 
Separately, in another federal case involving Act 312, on April 1, 
2014, Judge Vance rejected the notion that Act 312 could support an 
independent substantive cause of action: 
The Court does not interpret plaintiffs’ complaint to assert a 
standalone claim under La. Rev. Stat. § 30:29. That statute is 
‘procedural, rather than substantive, and does not create a right of 
action in favor of landowners.’ Section 30:29 merely specifies the 
procedures applicable to lawsuits alleging environmental damage; 
the substantive law is supplied by the Louisiana Civil and Mineral 
Codes and other applicable statutory law and jurisprudence.96 
The Brownell Land order is fully consistent with the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in State v. Louisiana Land & 
Exploration Co., wherein the court described the order of trial as follows: 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. 
 94. Duplantier Family P’ship v. BP Amoco, 2007-0293 (La. App. 4 Cir 5/16/07), 
955 So. 2d 763; writ denied, 2007-1271 (La. 09/28/07), 964 So. 2d 368; 2007-1265 
(La. 9/28/07), 964 So. 2d 368. As indicated in the cited passage, Duplantier was a 
state court legacy litigation case that turned on the issue of the order of trial in a case 
under section 30:29. 07-1271 (La. 09/28/2007); 964 So. 2d 367, 368. 
 95. Brownell Land Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d at 959 (internal citations omitted). 
 96. Alford v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 581, 589 (E.D. La. 2014); 
see also, Alford v. Anadarko E&P Onshore L.L.C., No. 13-5457, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 55724, at *10 n.25 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2014) (internal citations omitted). 
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In Subsection H, the legislature specifically makes clear the 
statute was not intended to change the substantive law. Subsection 
H states that the procedure enacted by this Section shall not 
preclude a landowner from pursuing a judicial remedy or 
receiving a judicial award for private claims, other than those 
remediation damages necessary to fund the feasible plan to 
remediate the land to a standard that protects the public interest, 
i.e. “except as otherwise provided in this Section.” If a court 
awards remediation damages pursuant to an express contract 
provision that is a greater amount than that ordered to be placed 
into the court's registry to fund the remediation plan, then the 
landowner is entitled to those “excess” remediation damages. 
Likewise, “any award” for “additional remediation” may be kept 
by the landowner, as well. If the money judgment for remediation 
exceeds the amount necessary to fund the plan, the plaintiff is 
granted a personal judgment for the “excess” remediation 
damages; plaintiff is also granted a personal judgment on his other 
non-remediation private claims (if he prevailed on such claims at 
trial). All of these determinations are made part of a single 
judgment, and any party aggrieved by any aspect of this single 
judgment may appeal. The court of appeal correctly determined 
“[t]he clear language of the statute contemplates the landowner 
receiving an award in addition to that provided by the feasible 
plan.” The legislature states that the procedure it enacts in this 
legislation should not be interpreted as creating any cause of 
action or to impose additional implied obligations under the 
Mineral Code or arising out of a mineral lease that is not already 
there. As previously discussed, this procedural statute does 
nothing to the substantive rights of the landowner, whether arising 
out of (1) the implied obligations of the mineral lease under the 
Civil Code or (2) the implied obligation arising out of La. R.S. 
31:122 if the landowner can show a mineral lessee has acted 
unreasonably or excessively under the lease.97 
B. Notice, Stay and State Intervention Provisions 
As noted supra, the notice and stay provisions of Act 312 appear in 
subsection 30:29(B). This subsection requires that the party filing a 
judicial demand for environmental damage shall immediately “provide 
timely notice to the state of Louisiana through the Department of Natural 
                                                                                                             
 97. State v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 2012-0884 (La. 10/30/13), 110 So. 3d 
1038, 1054. 
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Resources, commissioner of conservation and the attorney general,” and 
makes additional provision for a stay of the litigation with respect to any 
such judicial demands until thirty days after the issuance of the notice and 
the filing into the record of return receipt(s) establishing receipt of the 
notice.98 The law allows for the state’s intervention in the proceeding “in 
accordance with the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.”99 Finally, 
subsection 30:29(B)(4) provides: “No judgment or order shall be rendered 
granting any relief in such litigation to which this Section applies, nor shall 
the litigation be dismissed, until timely notice is received by the state of 
Louisiana as set forth in this Subsection.”100 
Weyerhauser v. Petro-Hunt represents one instance of a federal court’s 
refusal to apply the notice and stay provisions of section 30:29 (B)(1) and 
(2).101 That case was filed on October 21, 2004, prior to the enactment of 
section 30:29.102 However, during the course of the litigation, section 
30:29 was enacted, the plaintiff thereafter sought to invoke subsection 
30:29(B)’s regulatory notice and stay provisions.103 The defendant 
opposed this effort.104 On September 22, 2006, the court denied the 
plaintiff’s motion to stay the action, with the note: “Denied. A state 
statutory procedural stay is not applicable in this court.”105 
It should be noted that, in response to a primary jurisdiction defense 
raised by the defendant before the enactment of Act 312,106 the 
Weyerhauser court had ordered the Plaintiff to seek the following from the 
LDNR: 
1) a determination regarding whether the well and/or wells at 
issue had been operated according to the rules and regulations 
of the OCC; 
2) a determination regarding whether the plaintiff’s request for 
injunctive relief (to prevent further environmental 
contamination) was within the jurisdiction of the 
Commissioner of Conservation; and 
                                                                                                             
 98. La. R.S. § 30:29 (2007). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., No. 1:04-cv-02177 (W.D. La.). 
 102. The effective date of 2006 La. Acts 312 was June 8, 2006. 
 103. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., No. 1:04-cv-02177, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84329, at *6 (W.D. La. Sep. 29, 2008) (Doc. 101). 
 104. See generally, Weyerhauser Co.; id. (Doc. 102). 
 105. Id. (Doc. 104). 
 106. Id. (Doc. 13). 
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3) such additional data as may be useful in disposing of the 
issues before the court.107 
Contemporaneously, the court had also stayed all proceedings in the 
case, with the exception of those pertaining to discovery, pending the 
receipt of information from the OCC.108 By the time the court’s denial of 
a stay under the newly enacted section 30:29(B) in September, 2006,109 the 
plaintiff had already initiated proceedings before the OCC. In denying a 
stay under subsection 30:29(B), the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument 
that the May, 2006 referral of issues to the OCC stood at odds with the 
new statute and should be withdrawn.110 As a practical matter, the LDNR 
had already been put on notice of the litigation.111 
The Groundwater Remediation Act (GRA)112 contains a provision 
similar to subsection 30:29(B). In fact, the GRA’s Part (B) requires that 
those filing suit give notice of the filing to the LDEQ, and it recognizes 
LDEQ’s  right to intervene in litigation containing claims for recovery for 
the evaluation and remediation of any contamination or pollution that is 
alleged to impact or threaten usable ground water, in accordance with the 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. However, unlike section 30:29(B), 
Part (B) of the GRA does not contain any provision for a stay of the 
litigation after issuance of the notice. In Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 
District Judge Fallon of the Eastern District refused to dispense with the 
notice requirement of GRA, Part (B), which he characterized as “not 
burdensome” and a procedure “that serves the purpose of allowing the 
state agencies to intervene in the litigation.”113 
                                                                                                             
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84329, at *6 (Doc. 104). 
 110. Id. (Doc. 99). 
 111. Id. 
 112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(B) (2016). 
 113. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45123, at *19–20 (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 2005). In a 
related ruling, Judge Fallon recognized that the plaintiffs had asserted a cause of 
action in the case under the GRA (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1). Turner v. 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597, 609–10 (E.D. La. 2006). Cf., with 
Brownell Land Co., v. Apache Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36594, at *18 (E.D. 
La. Oct. 13, 2005) (finding that the notification was not necessary since plaintiff 
did not make a claim that related to usable ground water), and Frank C. Minvielle. 
L.L.C. v. IMC Global Operations, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 755, 761 n.19 (W.D. La. 
2004) (notification was not required because the plaintiffs expressly disclaimed 
the pursuit of any claims for, or remediation of, ground water contamination.). 
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C. The Preliminary Hearing 
Subsection (B)(6) of title 30, section 29 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, 
in providing for the preliminary hearing added by the 2012 amendments, 
prescribes: “Within sixty days of being served with a petition or amended 
petition asserting an action, a defendant may request that the court conduct a 
preliminary hearing to determine whether there is good cause for maintaining 
the defendant as a party in the litigation.”114 From the time of its enactment, 
disputes have arisen around whether Act 312 facilitates the employment of 
the preliminary hearing vehicle in federal cases. 
Of particular note in this vein is the ongoing litigation in Constance v. 
Austral Oil Exploration Co.115 That case was filed on April 11, 2012, and, 
within a short period of time, several defendants moved for the setting of 
a preliminary hearing under newly enacted subsection 30:29(B)(6).116 
Their efforts were unsuccessful, for on December 13, 2013, District Judge 
Patricia Minaldi refused the defendants’ applications for preliminary 
hearings under section 30:29(B)(6).117 
Judge Minaldi started her analysis by noting the plaintiffs’ point under 
Erie and the Rules Enabling Act118 that section 30:29 is a purely 
procedural statute,119 so that it could not apply in federal court 
proceedings. She also considered the defendants’ counterarguments that: 
(1) section 30:29 satisfied Erie’s parameters for federal application 
notwithstanding Louisiana Land;120 and (2) the statute must be applied in 
the federal setting in order to discourage forum-shopping.121 Her analysis 
of the Erie issue included her express consideration of the Brownell Land 
holding that, even though it is procedural, parts of the Act are of such 
significance that they can be applied in federal cases. In the end, the 
Constance court found it unnecessary to reach an Erie determination in 
disposing of the defendants’ motions for preliminary hearings: 
                                                                                                             
 114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(6) (2016). 
 115. Constance v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 2013 WL 6578178 (W.D. La. 
Dec. 13, 2013). 
 116. The court’s ruling identifies the defendants’ motions covered thereby. 
See, id. at *1. 
 117. Id. at *17 
 118. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2077 (2016). 
 119. The plaintiffs relied upon Louisiana Land & Exploration, 110 So. 3d at 
1053 for this position. Constance, 2013 WL 6578178, at *15. 
 120. The defendants asserted that section 30:29 did not conflict with any 
federal rule, so that, with application of the outcome-determinative test and 
consideration of whether the state rule is “‘bound up’ with state-secured 
substantive rights and obligations,” the statute must be regarded as part of a 
cohesive statutory scheme designed to regulate the remediation of oilfield sites in 
the state. Constance, 2013 WL 6578178, at *15. 
 121. Id. 
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Assuming, arguendo, that the Act is applicable to a federal court 
sitting in diversity, the Act’s plain language merely asserts that “a 
defendant may request that the court conduct a preliminary 
hearing. 
* * * 
Applying [the] interpretative principles [of statutory 
construction], a plain reading of the Act indicates that it merely 
gives the defendants the option to request a preliminary hearing. 
The Act does not require that a preliminary hearing be held. 
Rather, that decision seems to be at the discretion of the court.122 
The court acknowledged the objective of Act 312’s preliminary 
hearing to ensure a good faith basis for suit against each defendant, but it 
also found that this objective was redundant given the plaintiff’s 
underlying good faith obligation under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In addition, the court noted that the plaintiffs had submitted 
affidavit evidence of environmental damage in support of the basis for 
maintaining the action.123 The court’s opinion continued: 
There are two possibilities: either the Act is substantive in nature 
or it is procedural. If it is substantive, then it must be applied by a 
federal court sitting in diversity. However, in this instance, 
assuming without deciding that the Act is substantive in nature, it 
merely permits a defendant to request a preliminary hearing to 
determine whether good cause is shown for maintaining suit 
against it. As the Act does not guarantee that a preliminary hearing 
be granted, and as the court finds that good cause has already been 
shown by the plaintiff, the court is disinclined to grant the 
defendants’ requests for a preliminary hearing. On the other hand, 
if the Act is purely procedural in nature, then the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure control and a federal court sitting in diversity need 
not follow the Act's procedural guidelines.124 
Similarly, in Tureau v. 2H, Inc.,125 the defendants moved for the 
setting of a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 30:29(B)(6) prior to 
the removal of the case.126 Post removal, and after an initial round of 
motion practice before the federal district court, the case was broken up 
                                                                                                             
 122. Id. at *16. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 2015 WL 4623615 (W.D. La. July 31, 2015). 
 126. See the discussion in Defendant Hess Corporation’s Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Preliminary Hearing Pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. § 30:29(B)(6) at 
943, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02969 (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2014) (Doc. 54-1). 
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into three related cases.127 The pending motions were terminated, but with 
an express grant of leave to refile.128 Hess Corporation, one of the Tureau 
defendants, re-urged its motion for the setting of a preliminary hearing on 
October 23, 2014, within a renewed sixty-day period.129 The plaintiff filed 
an opposition to the motion on both factual and legal grounds; in 
particular, the plaintiff directly challenged the applicability of Act 312 in 
federal courts as a matter of law.130 Citing Weyerhauser, Constance, and 
Louisiana Land & Exploration, the plaintiff asserted that “there is no 
reasonable basis upon which to conclude that Act 312’s procedural rules 
should be applied to the instant case.”131 The plaintiff also contended that 
Judge Barbier’s conclusion in Brownell Land that a federal court is “bound 
to follow the substantive law of the state, and even its procedural law, 
when it affects substantive rights” was distinguishable.132 Hess responded 
by filing a reply to the opposition maintaining the general applicability of 
section 30:29 under Erie principles.133 
In a Memorandum Order issued on April 22, 2015,134 the court denied 
Hess’s motion for a preliminary hearing.135 Following the analysis set forth in 
Constance, the court found the preliminary hearing vehicle of section 30:29 
to be procedural—even if it were not (i.e., even if it were substantive), it would 
not be binding because the preliminary hearing mechanism is volitional for 
defendants and discretionary for the courts.136 In addition, the court criticized 
the preliminary hearing concept as implicating illogical and wasteful federal 
                                                                                                             
 127. See id., Memorandum Order at 2318, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-
02969 (W.D. La. Apr. 22, 2014) (Doc. 106), 2014 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 139780. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id., Defendant Hess Corporation’s Motion for Preliminary Hearing 
Pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. §30-29(B)(6) at 941, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-
02969 (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2014) (Doc. 54). 
 130. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Hearing, and in the 
Alternative, Opposition to Preliminary Dismissal Filed on Behalf of Defendant, 
Hess Corporation at 981, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02969 (W.D. La. Nov. 
13, 2014) (Doc. 57). 
 131. Id. at 993. 
 132. Id. The plaintiff argued that Brownell Land’s analogy to Louisiana’s 
medical malpractice laws [now LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1231.1 to 1231.10] 
was inapposite because Act 312 contains no requirement for the exhaustion of 
administrative procedures prior to filing suit. 
 133. Hess Corporation’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for 
Preliminary Hearing Pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute Section 30:29(B)(6) 
at 2061, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02969 (W.D. La. Jan. 20, 2015) (Doc. 
78). Hess cited All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 335-36 (5th Cir. 
2011) in support of an Erie argument for application of Act 312’s preliminary 
hearing feature based on Brownell Land. 
 134. Memorandum Order at 2318, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02969 
(W.D. La. Apr. 22, 2014) (Doc. 106). 
 135. Id. at 2318–19. 
 136. Id. at 2319. 
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court proceedings.137 Finally and, as the court noted, most importantly, the 
court had already found that the plaintiff had effectively stated a cause of 
action for alleged contamination of his property.138 Thus, the court denied the 
motion for preliminary hearing.139 
In sum, the question of the availability of an Act 312 preliminary hearing 
in federal court is unsettled. The issue appears to be regarded as one within 
the realm of judicial discretion, as described in Constance.140 Its practical 
similarity to Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a 
salient consideration prejudicing liberal application of the preliminary hearing 
mechanism in federal courts. 
D. The Limited Admission and LDNR Determination of the Most 
Feasible Plan 
The Western District has recently recognized and employed, albeit in 
absence of direct objection, two of the newest elements of the Act 312 
panoply—namely, the option of the limited admission under Louisiana 
Code of Civil Procedure article 1563 and the concomitant provision 
governing the submission of a proffered “most feasible” remediation plan. 
Moore v. Denbury Offshore, L.L.C. involved the rupture of a six-inch 
saltwater flowline in Richland Parish, Louisiana.141 Following the rupture, 
Denbury Offshore, L.L.C. (Denbury) notified the LDEQ of the incident 
and began assessment and remediation activities at the site under the 
supervision of the LDEQ.142 Roughly a year later, the plaintiff landowners 
instituted an action in the Fifth Judicial District Court for the State of 
Louisiana.143 Denbury removed the case to the Western District on the 
basis of diversity of citizenship.144 Subsequently, Denbury stipulated to the 
presence of environmental damage and moved for the entry of an order 
referring the case to the LDNR pursuant to subsection 30:29(I)(1) and 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1563.145 The plaintiffs 
                                                                                                             
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Of additional note, in consolidated cases concerning the Bayou Corne 
Sinkhole, several defendants filed motions for preliminary hearings under section 
30:29(B)(6). LeBlanc v. Texas Brine Co., L.L.C., No. 2:12-cv-2059 (E.D. La. 
Aug. 10, 2012) (Docs. 59; 171; 174). 
 141. Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., No. 3:14-cv-00913 (W.D. La.). 
 142. See Motion for Entry of Order to Refer Matter to La. Dep’t of Natural Res. 
for Public Hearing and Limited Admission of Responsibility for Envtl. Damage at 75, 
Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Jan. 28, 2015) (Doc. 21). 
 143. Notice of Removal at 75, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. 
Apr. 29, 2014) (Doc. 1). 
 144. Id. 
 145. See supra note 142. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(l)(1) (2007). 
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responded to the Denbury motion,146 but they did not directly oppose 
Denbury’s request for referral to the LDNR. The focus of their opposition 
was the concern that the referral would delay the trial of the case.147 Stated 
differently, the principal dispute between the parties at the time concerned 
the procedural operation of article 1563—and not the defendant’s right to 
invoke the procedure in a federal setting.148 In fact, three days before the 
plaintiffs submitted their memorandum, the court had vacated the 
Scheduling Order that had provided for a June 2015 trial date, with any 
future scheduling “pending the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s Motion for 
Entry of an Order to Refer the Matter to the Louisiana Department of 
Natural Resources . . . .”149 The court granted the referral “for the development 
of the most feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the environmental damage 
on the Plaintiffs’ property to applicable state regulatory standards, in 
accordance with [subsection] 30:29(C).”150 In the same Order, the court 
specified the sequence and schedule for the submission of proposed plans to 
the LDNR, as well as the requirement that Denbury post $100,000 with the 
LDNR as security for the costs related to the OCC’s review of the plans and 
the subsequent public hearing mandated under section 30:29.151 
The parties to the case abided by the court’s requirements, and each 
presented proposed plans of remediation to the LDNR.152 The LDNR 
conducted a hearing and issued its determination of the most feasible 
remediation plan.153 Its written findings, together with its reasons and 
pertinent supporting documentation, were accepted for filing into the record 
                                                                                                             
 146. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Entry of an Order to Refer 
Matter to La. Dep’t of Natural Res. for Public Hearing and Limited Admission of 
Responsibility for Envtl. Damage at 125, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. 
(W.D. La. Feb. 20, 2015) (Doc. 21). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Extension at 124, 
Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Feb. 17, 2015) (Doc. 20). 
 150. Order Granting Motion 11 to Refer Matter to La. Dep’t of Natural Res. 
Office of Conservation at 193, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Mar. 
23, 2015) (Doc. 26). 
 151. Id. 
 152. The competing plans are available at the Environmental Division’s page 
on the LDNR’s website. See Environmental Division, LDNR, http://dnr.louisiana 
.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=134&pnid=21&nid=27 (last 
viewed Feb. 24, 2016) [https://perma.cc/775V-3XYJ]. 
 153. See Motion for Leave to File Most Feasible Plan, Written Reasons, & 
Affidavits with Consent of La. Dep’t of Natural Res. Office of Conservation at 
203, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., (W.D. La. Oct. 22, 2015) (Doc. 28); 
Order Granting Motion 28 for Leave to File Most Feasible Plan, Written Reasons, 
& Affidavits at 244, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2015) 
(Doc. 29); Most Feasible Plan by La. Dep’t of Natural Res. at 245, Moore v. 
Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2015) (Doc. 30). 
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of the federal case on October 23, 2015.154 The case settled shortly before it 
was scheduled to go to trial in March 2016. 
In practical terms, the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure article 
1563 in the Moore case involved no controversy. But what was left unresolved 
by the course of the case was the timing of the determination of the most 
feasible plan in relation to a trial on the merits. As it turned out in Moore, the 
LDNR reached a most feasible plan determination well prior to any scheduled 
trial date, rendering that the issue moot.155 However, questions remain, both 
on the state and federal levels, as to whether an unresolved administrative 
process pursuant to article 1563 can serve to forestall or delay an Act 312 trial. 
Moore is also interesting when contrasted against Brownell and 
Constance, both of which predated enactment of the limited admission 
provisions of article 1563. In Constance, the federal court characterized 
the Act 312’s preliminary hearing provisions as discretionary in federal 
court.156 The court reasoned that, even if Act 312’s preliminary hearing 
vehicle were a substantive right under Erie, the Act does not guarantee the 
right to such a hearing.157 Correspondingly, the Constance court found that 
if Act 312’s preliminary hearing element creates a procedural right, then 
the federal court is not bound to follow the Act’s procedural guidelines.158 
In Moore, the defendant submitted that Act 312’s limited admission 
procedures affect substantive rights.159 Moreover, in contrast to the 
potentially discretionary preliminary hearing provisions of subsection 
30:29(B)(6), article 1563(A)(2) directs that, upon submission of a timely 
limited admission, a court “shall refer the matter to the [Louisiana] 
Department of Natural Resources, office of conservation . . . to conduct a 
public hearing to approve or structure a plan which the department 
determines to be the most feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the 
environmental damage under the applicable regulatory standards pursuant 
to the provisions of R.S. 30:29.”160 Thus, in terms of existing 
jurisprudence, the argument in favor of federal courts applying article 
1563’s limited admission and most feasible plan elements would appear 
to rest on stronger footing than its preliminary hearing counterpart. 
                                                                                                             
 154. See Order Granting Motion 28 for Leave to File Most Feasible Plan, 
Written Reasons, & Affidavits at 244, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. 
La. Oct. 23, 2015) (Doc. 29); Most Feasible Plan by La. Dep’t of Natural Res. at 
245, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2015) (Doc. 30). 
 155. The LDNR submittal took place in October, 2015. The case was 
scheduled for trial in March, 2016. 
 156. Constance, 2013 WL 6578178, at *16. 
 157. Id. at *17. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., No. 3:14CV913, 2016 WL 393549, 
at *1 (W.D. La. Feb. 1, 2016); see, e.g. Rec.Doc. 19, Page ID # 120. 
 160. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1563 (A)(2) (2014). 
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E. The Remediation Plan Provisions 
With the exception of the Moore case, there appears to be no other 
instance of a federal court’s application of the “most feasible plan” 
provisions of Act 312. Based on spoliation of evidence, the court in 
Weyerhauser entered an adverse evidentiary inference against the 
defendant of environmental damage, but it reserved determination of the 
extent of such damage for future resolution.161 However, in addressing the 
plaintiff’s insistence upon the applicability of section 30:29, the 
Weyerhauser court stated: 
While finding the statute helpful in reaching the present ruling, we 
decline to apply the procedural aspects of this state statute in the 
present diversity action. Accordingly, we refrain from ordering the 
development of ‘a plan or submittal for the evaluation or remediation 
to applicable standards of the contamination that resulted in the 
environmental damage’ or similar procedural undertakings in this 
case.162 
The Weyerhauser case proceeded through additional discovery and 
pre-trial development following this ruling, and it ultimately settled.163 
Interestingly, in presenting the settlement to the court, the parties 
acknowledged the applicability of Act 312 and affirmatively sought court 
approval pursuant to subsection 30:29(J).164 
F. The Approval of Settlements 
Subsection 30:29(J) addresses the requisites for any settlement 
reached in a case “subject to the provisions of this Section.” It has not been 
amended since its original enactment in 2006. In addition to requiring 
court approval, the subsection requires that the parties notify the LDNR 
and the LOAG of the settlement in principle. Those agencies are allowed 
thirty days to review the settlement and comment to the court. Section 
30:29(J)(1) further states: 
If after a contradictory hearing the court requires remediation, the 
court shall not certify or approve any settlement until an amount 
                                                                                                             
 161. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., No. CIV A 1:04-CV-02177, 
2008 WL 4425466, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 30, 2008). 
 162. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (C)(1) (2007). 
 163. See, e.g., Weyerhauser v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 1:04-CV-02177 (W.D.La. 
07/22/09) (Rec.Doc. 402; Page ID #5022). 
 164. Id., (07/20/09) (Rec.Doc. 396, Page ID# 4964) and (07/29/09) (Rec.Doc. 
401, Page ID# 5021). 
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of money sufficient to fund such remediation is deposited into the 
registry of the court. No funding of a settlement shall occur until 
the requirements of this Section have been satisfied. However, the 
court shall have the discretion to waive the requirements of this 
Section if the settlement reached is for a minimal amount and is 
not dispositive of the entire litigation.165 
Weyerhauser, as discussed supra, involved a joint motion made by 
settling parties under subsection 30:29(J) for the approval of a settlement 
based upon the submission of correspondence to and from the LDNR and 
the LOAG.166 The parties made no representation in their motion of the 
absence of court-ordered remediation, and the settlement under review 
involved all parties then in the case.167 The settlement agreement was 
submitted to the court under seal.168 Based upon this information, the court 
approved the settlement and ordered the dismissal of the case upon the 
submission of a stipulation of dismissal by the parties, with each party to 
bear its own costs.169 
In Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Sonoran Energy, Inc., the parties 
invoked subsection 30:29(J) and affirmatively sought the federal district 
court’s validation of a settlement reached in litigation negotiations.170 The 
parties secured a letter of no objection from the LDNR and submitted that 
document to the court in compliance with the requirements of the 
statute.171 They also produced copies of the underlying settlement 
agreements for submission to the court.172 
However, unlike Weyerhauser, the settlement of the case involved 
fewer than all parties to the litigation—the remaining defendants being 
two CGL insurers for a bankrupt defendant.173 The settling defendants 
requested that the court retain jurisdiction over the case while the 
                                                                                                             
 165. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §30:29(J)(2) provides: 
“In the event a settlement is agreed to between the parties in a case in 
which the department or the attorney general has intervened, such agency 
shall be entitled to recover from the settling defendants all costs, 
including investigation, evaluation, and review costs; expert witness 
fees; and reasonable attorney fees.” 
 166. Weyerhauser Co., 1:04-CV-02177, (07/20/09; Rec.Doc. 396, Page ID# 
4964) and (07/29/09; Rec.Doc. 401, Page ID# 5021). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Weyerhauser Co., 1:04-CV-02177 (07/29/09; Rec.Doc. 401, Page ID# 
5021). 
 170. Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Sonoran Energy, Inc., 1:10 CV 01684 
(W.D.La.); see Rec.Doc. 35, Page ID# 396 (06/06/12). 
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 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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remediation contemplated in the settlement proceeded and the parties 
attempted to work out inter sese the resolution of the remaining claims.174 
Having considered the positions of the parties, the court concluded that the 
settlement complied with the provisions of section 30:29 and entered 
judgment approving the settlement in June, 2012.175 In so doing, however, 
the court required periodic reporting from the parties as to the progress of 
the extra-judicial remediation plan encompassed within the settlement.176 
No apparent issue arose concerning the actual applicability vel non of 
the provisions of subsection 30:29(J) in federal cases; the parties 
affirmatively represented that the case was indeed subject to the provisions 
of that section.177 The record made no indication of a court-ordered 
remediation, nor of the court’s requiring or waiving a deposit into the 
registry of the court of money sufficient to fund the extra-judicial 
remediation.178 Although the settlement, on its face, involved fewer than 
all parties to the case, the settling parties sought and were granted a 
judgment that included, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ assignment—and the 
settling defendants’ correlative reservation—of rights as against all non-
settling defendants.179 
The record did not indicate that the settlement had been reached for a 
“minimal amount.” Nevertheless, the settlement presented to the court 
called for remediation to be carried out extra-judicially,180 with no formal 
edict of the court requiring remediation. Thus, while the record does not 
dispel the possibility that the court and the parties viewed the statutory 
provisions as being non-binding, there appeared a firm basis for the 
manner of judicial acceptance of the settlement, even under the terms of 
subsection 30:29(J). 
Sweet Lake Land and Oil Company v. Exxon Mobil stands as another 
example of an Act 312 case involving settlements subject to the review of 
the federal district court. All principal parties to that suit reached two 
agreements in principle to settle the litigation in February, 2012; the basic 
                                                                                                             
 174. Id. 
 175. Id., (06/21/12) (Rec.Doc. 42, Page ID# 451; Rec.Doc. 44 (transcript), 
Page ID# 454). 
 176. Id.; see Minute Entry (11/16/12, Rec.Doc. 50, Page ID# 472); Joint Status 
Report (05/31/13, Rec.Doc. 51, Page ID# 473);Order, Rec.Doc. 52 (09/11/13, 
Page ID# 482); Updated Joint Status Report, Rec.Doc. 53 (12/31/13, Page ID# 
483); Order, Rec.Doc. 54 (01/07/14, Page ID# 489); Updated Joint Status Report, 
Rec.Doc. 55 (12/31/14, Page ID# 490). 
 177. See Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Sonoran Energy, Inc., Joint Motion 
for Approval of Settlement (06/06/12, Rec.Doc. 35, Page ID# 396). 
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 179. Id.; see Transcript of Motion Hearing, (07/11/12, Rec.Doc. 44, Page ID# 
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settlements provided for the resolution of all but a third party demand of a 
single defendant.181 As in Crowell Land, details of the two proposed 
settlements were thereafter presented to the OCC; and the OCC issued a 
letter of no objection regarding both.182 Subsequently, the parties moved 
under subsection 30:29(J)(1) for orders from the federal court approving 
the settlements and for judgments of partial dismissal.183 In their motions, 
the parties noted that the case was subject to section 30:29, and subsection 
(J)(1) in particular.184 Both motions contained representations that neither 
of the settlements resolved the entire litigation and that the parties had 
made arrangements to remediate the property to regulatory standards.185 
The OCC response letter, submitted into the record in support of both 
motions, represented that the OCC bore no objections to the settlements, 
but noted in addition: “Based upon the two settlements, it does not appear 
that any portion of the settlement amounts are to be placed into the registry 
of the court for remediation expenses associated with the Property as may 
be required under certain circumstances pursuant to La. R.S. 30:29.”186 In 
August of 2012, the court granted the approval motions and entered partial 
dismissals in both instances, without requiring the deposit of monies into 
the registry of the court for the investigation and/or remediation of the 
subject property.187 Furthermore, despite its earlier intervention in the 
case, the LDNR did not judicially seek costs, fees, or expenses in 
connection with the resolution of the case. 
Another federal legacy litigation case, Maryland Company, L.L.C. v. 
Exxon Mobil, was brought to settlement in May, 2012, under the oversight of 
District Judge Haik.188 In the course of the litigation, defendant Exxon-Mobil 
moved to compel the plaintiff and other defendants which had agreed to a 
settlement among themselves to comply with the requirements of subsection 
                                                                                                             
 181. The Sweet Lake Land and Oil Co., v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2:09-CV-
01100 (W.D.La.). See also, Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Pursuant to 
La.R.S. 30:20.J and for Partial Final Judgment, 2:09-CV-01100 (07/12/12; 
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 188. Maryland Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 6:10-CV-01781 (W.D.La. Feb. 1, 
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(J) of title 30, section 29 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.189 The court, 
however, deferred ruling on that motion and the case ended up settling in its 
entirety.190 Of the subsequent motions for settlement approval, none called for 
continuing judicial oversight of remediation or registry deposits of settlement 
funds, and all were supported by conditional letters of no objection from the 
LDNR.191 While the settlement agreements themselves were confidential, the 
court ruled that: (1) the settlements were approved; (2) the third party 
defendant was to accept responsibility for clean-up of the site and the handling 
of all issues of regulatory compliance pursuant to the settlement agreement 
involving that party; and (3) the plaintiff’s claims and the third party claim 
were dismissed with prejudice, and for the most part with all parties being 
ordered to bear their own costs.192 
Judge Vance of the Eastern District followed a similar course of action in 
June, 2012, in C. S. Gaidry case.193 Based upon the presentation by the parties 
of a joint motion supported by the requisite correspondence to and from the 
public authorities, together with a redacted copy of the settlement agreement 
confected in the case,194 the court ordered the dismissal of the action, with 
prejudice, subject to “[d]efendants’ obligation to perform the obligations set 
forth in the Settlement Agreement.”195 Again, there was no requirement that 
                                                                                                             
 189. Id., Motion to Require Compliance with Settlement Provisions of La.R.S. 
30:29 on Behalf of Exxon Mobil Corporation, 6:10-CV-01781 (01/31/12; Rec.Doc. 
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 191. Id., Motion on Behalf of Maryland to: (1) Approve Settlement with 
Burlington and (2) to Dismiss Maryland’s Claims against Burlington and 
Quintana Defendants, 6:10-CV-01781 (03/27/12; Rec.Doc. 247; Page ID# 7806); 
Joint Motion per Order Doc. No. 253 (1) to Approve Settlement and (2) for 
Dismissal Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 41, 6:10-CV-01781 (05/10/12; Rec.Doc. 
257; Page ID# 7875). 
 192. Id., Judgment, 6:10-CV-01781 (05/31/12; Rec.Doc. 264; Page ID# 7900). 
The qualification on each party paying its own costs is due to the absence of any 
statement in the final judgment to that effect with regard to the third party claim. 
 193. C. S. Gaidry, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 2:09-CV-02762, 2009 
U.S.Dist.LEXIS 83096 (E.D.La. Aug. 26, 2009). 
 194. Id.; See Joint Motion for Court Approval of Settlement Pursuant to Act 
312 of 2006, La.R.S. 30:29 § J(1) and to Dismiss with Prejudice, (06/07/12; 
Rec.Doc. 125). 
 195. See id.; Order and Final Judgment (06/18/12; Rec.Doc. 126). 
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a deposit into the court registry of funds associated with remediation of the 
property.196  The settlement disposed of the entire litigation.197 
Martin v. Tesoro Corp. represents a more recent handling of judicial 
approval of settlements pursuant to Act 312. The parties in that suit 
included in their motions the representations that no finding had been 
made in the case that any defendant was a responsible party within the 
meaning of section 30:29, or that any environmental damage existed on 
any portion of the property.198 Consistent with the motions, the court 
entered final judgments dismissing the action, with prejudice, with no 
requirement of deposit and with no provision for continuing judicial 
oversight of the remediation plans.199 
In sum, this survey of Act 312 federal litigation reveals no instance of 
a court’s ordering any settling party to deposit monies into a court registry 
pursuant to subsection 30:29(J)(1). Likewise, there appears to be no 
recorded instance of a settlement involving a federal courts’ mandate of 
remediation, apart from the rare qualification that the parties remediate the 
involved property in accordance with the terms of the given settlement 
agreement. Furthermore, none of the cases reviewed include any award to 
the state pursuant to subsection 30:29(J)(2). A higher likelihood of coming 
across a settlement involving a registry deposit, or court-supervised 
remediation, or regulatory reimbursement seemingly would exist in an Act 
312 case that included the LDNR as a direct party. 
F. Judicial Oversight of the Most Feasible Remediation Plan’s 
Implementation 
As noted earlier, in Crowell Land, the settlement presented to and 
approved by the court called for the parties themselves to manage any 
extra-judicial remediation to be carried out under LDNR’s oversight; no 
                                                                                                             
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Martin v. Tesoro Corp., 2:11-CV-01413 (W.D.La. May 21, 2012). See 
Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Pursuant to La.R.S. 30:29.J and for Final 
Judgment under FED. R. CIV. P.54(b) Dismissing with Prejudice Plaintiff’s Claims 
against Defendants Koch, Tesoro, and ConocoPhillips (id., Aug. 29, 2013 
(Rec.Doc. 116; Page ID# 1612)); Order, (id., Sept. 5, 2013 (Rec.Doc. 117; Page 
ID# 1627)); Motion to Approve Settlement Pursuant to La.R.S. 30:29.J and for 
Final Judgment under FED. R. CIV. P.54(b) Dismissing with Prejudice Plaintiff’s 
Claims against Defendants BP America Production Company, Successor in 
Interest to Amoco Production Company and Stanolind Oil and Gas Company (id., 
June 19, 2014 (Rec.Doc. 118; Page ID# 1629)); Order, (id., July 24, 2014 
(Rec.Doc. 119; Page ID# 1635); and OCC Letter (id., Oct. 8, 2014 (Rec.Doc. 120; 
Page ID# 1637). 
 199. Id. 
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court-ordered remediation was involved.200 Nevertheless, the settlement 
did not dispose of the case, and the court maintained authority over the 
course and completion of the remediation.201 In fact, the court continued 
to require the parties to submit periodic reports on the progress of the 
effort.202 Further, any open litigation matters on the docket regarding other 
parties were preserved for future action as necessary.203 
In comparison, the settlements in Sweet Lake Land and Maryland 
Company also provided for private, extra-judicial remediation of the 
properties made subject of the suits.204 Again, no court-ordered 
remediation was provided for as part of the approval process.205 In those 
cases, however, the courts did not exercise supervisory authority over, nor 
monitoring of, the progress of the remediation efforts.206 
G. Provisions for the Allowance of Costs and Attorney’s Fees 
While this article has discussed Weyerhauser,207 supra, in the contexts 
of the notice and stay provisions of subsection 30:29(B), the court’s 
rejection of the remediation plan feature of subsection 30:29(C)(1), and 
the settlement approval processes set forth in subsection 30:29(J), the case 
also reaches into substantive considerations.208 In the very same ruling in 
which it rejected the procedural aspects of the statute—the Weyerhauser 
court noted, “in a more substantive vein,” the statute’s provision for the 
award of attorney’s fees against the party responsible for the 
environmental damage.209 The court acknowledged the plaintiff’s request 
for an award of fees under the statute arising out of the adverse inferential 
finding of environmental damage entered against the defendant.210 Citing 
                                                                                                             
 200. Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Sonoran Energy, Inc., 1:10-CV-01684 
(W.D.La. July 11, 2012); Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement (June 6, 2012, 
Rec.Doc. 35, Page ID# 396). 
 201. Id. See also Transcript of Motion Hearing, Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. 
v. Sonoran Energy, Inc., 1:10-CV-01684, Rec.Doc. 44, Page ID# 454 (W.D.La. 
July 11, 2012). 
 202. See supra note 200. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 2:09-CV-01100; Maryland Co., 6:10-CV-
01781. 
 205. See supra notes 181–192. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Weyerhauser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., No.1:04-CV-02177, 2008 WL 
4425466 (W.D.La. Sept. 29, 2008). 
 208. Weyerhauser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., No. 1:04-CV-02177, 2006 WL 
1228843 (W.D.La. May 2, 2006) dismissed by, Weyerhauser Co. v. Petro-Hunt 
L.L.C., 2008 WL 4425466 (W.D. La. Sept. 29, 2008). 
 209. Weyerhauser, 2008 WL 4425466 at *4. 
 210.  Id. at *3–4. 
2016] ACT 312 365 
 
 
 
Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Federal Insurance Company,211 the court also 
noted that an award of attorney’s fees is governed by the “substantive law 
applied to the underlying claims.”212 Thus, while recognizing a basis for 
an award, the court held the determination of the amount of any fee award 
in abeyance pending resolution of the case on the merits “or otherwise.”213 
V. CONCLUSION 
One common factor appearing repeatedly in federal cases dealing with 
Act 312 is the courts’ lack of hesitance in assessing various legacy 
litigation elements and claims under the parameters of Rules 12(b)(6), 
12(e), and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Louisiana 
substantive law apart from Act 312.214 Clearly, federal courts are more 
focused upon the substantive elements of legacy litigation than the procedures 
prescribed by Act 312.215 In fact, Act 312 appears to assume only secondary 
importance in the analysis, at least with regard to the pre-judgment stages.216 
As for the practical order of litigation, “[u]nless a defendant admits 
responsibility or liability for ‘environmental damage’ as defined by the Act . 
. . all claims, including contractual and private claims, are determined by the 
finder of fact at trial.”217 The procedure at trial is well established; the notion 
that the Act requires that there first be a trial on liability—and only thereafter 
a trial on damages—has been widely rejected by both state and federal 
courts.218 Instead, the fact-finder reaches a determination on both liability and 
damages.219 At that point, assuming a finding for the claimant, Act 312 sets 
forth additional procedures to be used for the post-trial determination of the 
                                                                                                             
 211. Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Federal Insurance Co., 410 F.3d 214, 230 (5th Cir. 
2005). 
 212. Weyerhauser, 2008 WL 4425466, at *3–4; See also Ingalls, 410 F.3d 214, 
230 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 213. Weyerhauser, 2008 WL 4425466 at *4. 
 214. See, e.g., Constance v. Austral Oil Expl. Co., No. 2:12-CV-1252, 2013 
WL 6578178, at *1 (W.D. La. Dec. 13, 2013).; Alford v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 
13 F.Supp. 3d 581, 589 n.25 (E.D.La. Apr. 1, 2014) (order as modified); Alford 
v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, L.L.C., No. 2:13-CV-05457 (ref. 2:13-CV-05703), 
2014 WL 1612454, at *4 (E.D.La. Apr. 22, 2014). 
 215. Id. 
 216. “Section 30:29 merely specifies the procedures applicable to lawsuits 
alleging environmental damage; the substantive law is supplied by the Louisiana 
Civil and Mineral Codes and other applicable statutory law and jurisprudence. See 
La. Rev. Stat. § 30:29(H).” Alford, 13 F.Supp.3d at 589 n.25. 
 217. Louisiana. v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 2012-0884, p. 18 (La. Jan. 30, 
2013); 110 So.3d 1038, 1051. “At trial (in the absence of an admission), the finder 
of fact must initially determine whether environmental damage exists and whether 
the defendant or defendants are legally responsible therefore.” Id. 
 218. Id.; see also, Brownell Land Co., 538 F.Supp. 2d at 957–59. 
 219. Brownell Land Co., 538 F.Supp. 2d at 957–59. 
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most feasible remediation plan. Once the most feasible plan is determined, the 
court will order the parties found legally responsible to fund the 
implementation of that plan, and the portion of the damage award attributable 
to that implementation shall be deposited into the registry of the court, for 
disbursement during the course of plan implementation under the continued 
monitoring and oversight of the trial court.220 
Federal courts have accepted invitations to approve pre-trial settlements 
of legacy litigation claims under subsection 30:29(J), at least through the 
exercise of judicial discretion or party consent.221 Although subsection 
30:29(J)(1) provides that “[n]o funding of a settlement shall occur until the 
requirements of this Section have been satisfied,” the key distinguishing 
element is likely the voluntary—and not judicially imposed—assumption of 
responsibility for the remediation effort. 
Finally, it appears that fees may be awardable to a party successfully 
suing for environmental damage and remediation based, at least in part, upon 
the provisions of subsection 30:29(E). The argument would be that the 
subsection gives rise to a substantive basis under Louisiana law for the 
allowance of such an award. 
A key point to be taken from this discussion lies in the conclusion that the 
public interest at stake in judicial confirmation of litigation-funded 
remediation implementation is so great that labels of procedure and substance 
lose primary significance. In fact, the theme of this analysis harkens back to 
Judge Barbier’s prescient statements in 2007 in Brownell Land. The public’s 
interest in protecting, conserving, and replenishing the natural resources and 
environment of the state remains so fundamental and significant that, 
notwithstanding the overall procedural nature of the mother statute, some 
elements of Act 312 simply must be enforced by the federal courts. The 
Western District has echoed this principle: “Act 312 and the proper 
administration of justice compels [a federal] court to consideration of 
existence of contamination, responsibility for its remediation, and a plan for 
that remediation for the property involved in [the] litigation.”222 Primarily, this 
might include the post-judgment aspects of the Act, such as the judicial 
determination, oversight and certification of the most feasible judicially 
mandated remediation plan—whether that mandate be through order, or 
verdict, or approved settlement calling for judicial involvement and oversight. 
As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Louisiana Land & Exploration, 
and reiterated in Savoie, the Act makes no change to normal trial 
                                                                                                             
 220. Id. 
 221. Cf. Sweet Lake, with Crowell Land, supra note 181. 
 222. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 2:09-cv-01100 (09/01/11, Rec.Doc. 236; 
Page ID# 3252 at pp. 12–13). 
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procedures.223 Unless a defendant admits liability for environmental damage 
or remediation, or both, a case proceeds to trial in the same manner as any 
other proceeding.224 Even though all claims go to the fact-finder, the trial 
judge remains the final arbiter and administrator of the most feasible plan for 
remediation of the property to state regulatory standards.225 This approach 
would appear to apply equally in Louisiana’s federal courts. 
Therefore, while questions might persist as to the applicability of purely 
procedural elements of Act 312, such as the preliminary hearing or notice and 
stay provisions of the Act, public policy considerations countenance in favor 
of a federal court’s adherence to the post-judgment and settlement-approval 
features of the Act 312. 
 
                                                                                                             
 223. State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 2012-0884, p.15 
(La. 01/30/13); 110 So. 3d 1038, 1051; Savoie v. Richard, 2013-1370, pp. 7–8 
(La. 04/02/14); 137 So.3d 78, 85–86. 
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